Constitutions as Counter-Curses:  Revenue Allocation and the Resource Curse by Brower, Tom
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 1
2016
Constitutions as Counter-Curses: Revenue
Allocation and the Resource Curse
Tom Brower
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the
Environmental Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Tom Brower, Constitutions as Counter-Curses: Revenue Allocation and the Resource Curse, 24 J. L. & Pol'y (2016).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol24/iss2/1
291
CONSTITUTIONS AS COUNTER-CURSES: REVENUE
ALLOCATION AND THE RESOURCE CURSE
Tom Brower
The resource curse—the paradoxical relationship between
natural resource abundances and poorer economic growth, weaker
political institutions, and higher levels of conflict—remains one of
the most confounding issues in international development. Although
the literature has proffered a plethora of institutional solutions to
the resource curse, they have been vexed by a common theme: their
unsuccessful implementation in developing countries without the
proper institutional foundations that act as a bulwark against policy
reversal and the perpetuation of rent-seeking behavior. This Article
introduces constitutionally protected natural resource revenue
allocation institutions as a superior mechanism for a state to
allocate rents from natural resources. Constitutions act as credible
commitments both by formally entrenching rules and institutions
against legal change as well as by serving as coordination
mechanisms that significantly deter policy reversal due to the
significant costs associated with ignoring or undermining
constitutional provisions. As a result, constitutional revenue
allocations can help counter the resource curse because they are
more likely to endure and they can assist in managing and
distributing natural resource revenue in an efficient and equitable
 Vinson & Elkins LLP; J.D. 2015, University of Virginia School of Law; M.A.
2012, Indiana University; B.A. 2008, Washington and Lee University. This
Article was the recipient of the 2015 Phanor J. Eder J.D. Prize in Comparative
Law from the American Society of Comparative Law and was presented at the
Fourth Annual Conference of the Younger Comparativists Committee of the
American Society of Comparative Law on April 17, 2015. Additionally, it was
selected as part of the Lloyd N. Cutler Fellows in International Law Program and
was presented at the 2015 Salzburg Global Seminar on February 20, 2015. I am
very grateful to Mila Versteeg for her guidance, as well as Daniel Abebe, Rachel
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fashion. Ultimately, this Article makes significant conceptual and
theoretical contributions to one of the most pressing issues facing
international development.
“It is the devil’s excrement. We are drowning in the devil’s
excrement.”1
INTRODUCTION
Over the past half-century, scholars have devoted considerable
attention and energy to the resource curse—the paradoxical
relationship between natural resource abundances and poor rates of
economic growth, weaker and less democratic formal political
institutions, and higher levels of intra- and inter-state conflict.2
Although a number of policy and institutional solutions have been
proffered,3 their utility and applicability to poorly institutionalized
countries is limited by the problem of identifying a mechanism for
rent-seeking4 states to credibly commit to managing and utilizing
natural resource wealth in a restrained, welfare-enhancing, and non-
particularistic manner. Recognizing the limitations of the existing
literature, this Article draws on principles of comparative
constitutional and institutional design to suggest a new mechanism
for addressing the resource curse by providing constitutional
protections for natural resource revenue allocation institutions.
This Article contends that constitutions are useful in mitigating
the resource curse, particularly in poorly institutionalized countries,
through two mechanisms. First, constitutions serve as
precommitment mechanisms that bind future generations of citizens
to predetermined institutional forms through which politics is
practiced.5 By limiting the actions available to future state elites,
1 See TERRY LYNN KARL, THE PARADOX OF PLENTY: OIL BOOMS AND
PETRO-STATES 4 (1997) (quoting Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, Founder of OPEC).
2 See infra notes 11–17 and accompanying text.
3 See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
4 In this Article, rent-seeking refers to government restrictions upon the
social or political environments in which economic activity occurs in order to
capture existing wealth. SeeAnne O. Kreuger, The Political Economy of the Rent-
Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 291 (1974).
5 See infra Section II.A.
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constitutions increase the likelihood that natural resource revenue
allocation institutions remain implemented and substantively
unchanged. Second, constitutions operate as coordination
mechanisms. Operating as a “focal equilibrium,” constitutions
provide a set of functional governance structures to which all groups
will acquiesce. In doing so, constitutions impose high costs on actors
that seek to alter the existing equilibrium, entrenching the existing
institutional arrangement.6 This Article makes a noticeable
conceptual and theoretical contribution by integrating comparative
constitutionalism principles into the resource curse literature.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the concept
of the resource curse, reviews the literature on its causal
mechanisms, discusses institutional and policy responses to mitigate
the resource curse, and assesses the limitations of these responses.
With these limitations in mind, Part II provides a theoretical
framework that draws upon the constitutional design literature to
identify how constitutional protection for natural resource revenue
allocation institutions provides a superior mechanism for states to
credibly commit to efficiently allocate rents from natural resources.
Part III empirically analyzes two case studies, Alaska and Nigeria,
and their constitutionally protected mechanisms that allocate
revenue from natural resource rents. This Part largely focuses on
Nigeria, looking prospectively to assess steps Nigeria could take in
its constitution to improve its natural resource revenue allocation
and what lessons can be learned from the Alaskan constitution’s
natural resource fund and direct cash transfer system. The adoption
of a constitutionally protected natural resource fund that distributes
hydrocarbon revenue to the public in the form of dividends provides
the benefits of revenue distribution arrangements7 by minimizing
rent-seeking and creating the proper incentives for governance
without the considerable administrative and economic costs of
institutional reform. Part IV concludes and offers policy
implications.
6 See JohnM. Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions, 33 COMP. POL.
STUD. 735, 754 (2000).
7 See infra Section I.C.1.
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I. EXISTING INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THERESOURCE CURSE
A. Introducing the “Paradox of Plenty”
A “recurring motif of economic history,” the resource curse
describes the paradoxical phenomenon that natural resource
abundances are associated with poorer development outcomes.8
This “paradox of plenty” confounds on two fronts. First, it is
counterintuitive insofar as history has taught us that natural
resources have been a sine qua non for the development of national
manufacturing and materials industries.9 Second, countries that have
little or nothing in common ethnically, geographically, culturally, or
politically still seem to face the same predicament.10 Natural
resource endowments are often associated with poorer development
outcomes through economic, political, and social lenses. Studies
have shown that countries with natural resource endowments have
lower levels of economic growth compared to their resource-poor
counterparts.11 On the political front, “resource dependent
economies and resource booms seem to lead to highly dysfunctional
state behavior, particularly large public sectors and unsustainable
budgetary policies.”12 Natural resource endowments have also been
linked to weaker and less democratic formal political institutions,13
8 See Jeffrey D. Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Natural Resource Abundance
and Economic Growth 2 (Harvard Univ. Ctr. for Int’l Dev., Discussion Paper No.
517a, 1995).
9 See, e.g., id. at 3.
10 See KARL, supra note 1, at xv–xvi.
11 See generally RICHARD M. AUTY, SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT IN
MINERALECONOMIES: THERESOURCECURSETHESIS (1993); ALANGELB ET AL.,
OIL WINDFALLS: BLESSING OR CURSE? (1988); Gobind Nankani, Development
Problems of Mineral Exporting Countries (World Bank, Working Paper No. 354,
1979); Paul Collier & Benedikt Goderis, Prospects for Commodity Exporters:
Hunky Dory or Humpty Dumpty?, 8 WORLD ECON. 1 (2007); Sachs & Warner,
supra note 8. For case studies, see generally KARL, supra note 1; MICHAELROSS,
TIMBER BOOMS AND INSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (2001)
[hereinafter ROSS, TIMBER BOOMS AND INSTITUTIONALBREAKDOWN].
12 James A. Robinson et al., Political Foundations of the Resource Curse, 79
J. DEV. ECON. 447, 448 (2006).
13 See, e.g., Nancy Birdsall & Arvind Subramanian, Saving Iraq from Its Oil,
83 FOREIGNAFF. 77, 81 (2004); Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?,
CONSTITUTIONS AS COUNTER-CURSES 295
higher incidences of corruption,14 and greater misallocations of
public resources.15 Lastly, natural resource-dependent countries are
more prone to conflict16 and human rights abuses.17
In the 1950s, structuralist economists raised three main
objections to development strategies based on primary
commodities. First, primary commodity exporters would suffer
from a decline in the terms of trade, which would widen the gap
between the rich industrialized states and the poor resource-
exporting states.18 Second, “international commodities markets
53 WORLD POL. 325, 356–57 (2001) [hereinafter Ross, Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?]; Benjamin Smith, Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the
Developing World, 1960-1999, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 232, 238 (2004); Jay Ulfelder,
Natural Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy, 40 COMP. POL. STUD.
995, 996 (2007); Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, Addressing the
Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9804, 2003); Nicholas Shaxson, Oil, Corruption
and the Resource Curse, 83 INT’LAFF. 1123, 1124 (2007).
14 See Macartan Humphreys et al., Introduction: What is the Problem with
Natural Resource Wealth?, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 1, 11 (Macartan
Humphreys et al. eds., 2007); Aaron Tornell & Phillip R. Lane, The Voracity
Effect, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 23 (1999).
15 See THADDUNNING, CRUDEDEMOCRACY: NATURALRESOURCEWEALTH
AND POLITICAL REGIMES 5–22 (2008) (arguing that when elites gain their status
from the private sector, resource rents will reduce elite opposition to democracy
by decreasing popular demand for redistribution); Paul Collier & Anke
Hoeffler, Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy in Resource-Rich Societies,
53 EURO. ECON. REV. 293, 303–05 (2009) (finding that resource wealth has
tended to reduce economic growth in both autocracies and fledgling democracies
but that strong, functional checks and balances offset this effect).
16 See PAUL COLLIER, ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CIVIL CONFLICT AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 6 (2000); Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and
Grievance in Civil Wars, 56 OXFORDECON. PAPERS 563, 588 (2004); Paul Collier
et al., On the Duration of Civil War, 41 J. PEACERES. 253, 265 (2004); Macartan
Humphreys, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering
the Mechanisms, 49 CONFLICT RESOL. 508, 511–13 (2005); Ross, Does Oil
Hinder Democracy?, supra note 13, at 328.
17 See Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, supra note 13, at 335–36.
18 See, e.g., Raul Prebisch, U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN
AMERICA, U.N. Sales No. 50.II.G.2 (1950); H. W. Singer, The Distribution of
Gains Between Investing and Borrowing Countries, 40 AM. ECON. ASS’N 473
(1950). Terms of trade have been shown to be robust determinants of economic
growth. See, e.g., William Easterly et al., Good Policy or Good Luck? Country
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were subject to unusually sharp price fluctuations.”19 Accordingly,
states reliant on these volatile international markets would find these
fluctuations transferred to their domestic economies, making
government revenues and foreign exchange unreliable and private
investment prohibitively risky.20 Third, natural resource industries
were unlikely to stimulate broader economic growth because these
“enclave” sectors would be insufficiently linked to other sectors of
the national economy.21
A fourth, and the most well-known, theory of the resource curse
is the “Dutch disease,” so-named in light of the deterioration of the
Netherlands’ manufacturing sector following the discovery of oil in
the North Sea in the 1970s.22 The Dutch disease is characterized by
two main mechanisms: the “spending effect” and the “resource pull
effect.”23 First, a rise in the value of natural resource exports leads
to real exchange rate appreciation.24 As a result, non-natural
resource commodities are relatively more expensive, making them
both more difficult to export and less competitive against imports.25
Natural resource commodities generate foreign exchange that
facilitates the purchase of internationally traded goods instead of
Growth Performances and Temporary Shocks, 32 J. MONETARY ECON. 459
(1993); Enrique G. Mendoza, Terms-of-Trade Uncertainty and Economic
Growth, 54 J. DEV. ECON. 323 (1996).
19 Michael L. Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, 51
WORLD POL. 297, 301 (1999) [hereinafter Ross, The Political Economy of the
Resource Curse].
20 See generally JONATHAN V. LEVIN, THE EXPORT ECONOMIES: THEIR
PATTERN OFDEVELOPMENT INHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1960); Ragnar Nurkse,
Trade Fluctuations and Buffer Policies of Low-Income Countries, 11 KYKLOS
141 (1958).
21 Humphreys et al., supra note 14, at 4, 18 n.1.
22 Id. at 5. The moniker “Dutch disease” appears to have appeared for the
first time in the Economist magazine in 1977, in an article that sought to explain
the contrast between the “external health and internal ailments” of Holland’s
economy. The Dutch Disease, ECONOMIST, Nov. 26, 1977, at 82.
23 Humphreys et al., supra note 14, at 5.
24 Id. at 5; Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, supra note
19, at 306.
25 Humphreys et al., supra note 14, at 5.
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those that are domestically manufactured.26 Second, because of
different rates of return between sectors, factors of production are
shifted away from the non-tradables sector to the natural resource
sector; this raises the prices of such resources in the domestic
market, which, in turn, increases costs to domestic producers.27
The principal limiting factor of these macroeconomic
explanations, however, was the empirical variation in economic
performance among countries endowed with natural resources.28
While nations such as Nigeria and Venezuela epitomize the resource
curse,29 natural resource endowments were a blessing for nations
like Botswana and Norway.30 Political economists began explaining
“[t]he ‘resource curse’ [as a] primarily . . . political [rather than]
economic phenomenon."31 They identified policy failures as a
critical intervening variable and focused on analyzing how states
utilized and allocated the revenues associated with natural resource
endowments.32 Political economists proffered three main theories.
First, cognitive approaches suggested that resource wealth causes a
type of myopia among state actors.33 Upon receiving large
windfalls, governments grow irrationally optimistic about future
26 Id.; see also W. Max Corden & J. Peter Neary, Booming Sector and De-
Industrialization in a Small Open Economy, 92 ECON. J. 825, 827 (1982).
27 See Humphreys et al., supra note 14, at 5; Ross, The Political Economy of
the Resource Curse, supra note 19, at 306.
28 See, e.g., Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, supra note
19, at 308.
29 See, e.g., KARL, supra note 1, at 4.
30 See, e.g., Humphreys et al., supra note 14, at 2.
31 See Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent
Fiscal Social Contract, in ESCAPING THERESOURCECURSE, supra note 14, at 276,
276 [hereinafter Karl, Ensuring Fairness].
32 See Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, supra note 19, at
307; Jeffrey D. Sachs, How to Handle the Macroeconomics of Oil Wealth, in
ESCAPING THE RESOURCECURSE, supra note 14, at 173, 184–85.
33 See generally Hussein Mahdavy, The Patterns and Problems of Economic
Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran, in STUDIES IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 443 (M.A. Cook ed., 1970); Dani Rodrik,
Understanding Economic Policy Reform, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 9 (Mar. 1996)
(discussing cognitive approaches top policy failure). But see Ross, The Political
Economy of the Resource Curse, supra note 19, at 310 (noting studies that
describe “state actors who are well-informed about the perils of resource booms
but whose behavior is highly constrained by political pressures and institutions”).
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revenues and “devote the greater part of their resources to jealously
guarding the status quo” instead of promoting development.34 As a
result, “politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to
the socially efficient extraction path because they only care about
the future stock of resources if they are in power.”35 Societal theories
suggested that windfalls from natural resource booms enhance the
political leverage of non-state actors who favor growth-impeding
policies.36 If non-state actors associated with the natural resource
sector are able to collectively organize, their capacity to pressure the
government to adopt particular sector-friendly policies is
considerably improved.37 Many natural resource sectors are capital
intensive and have economies of scale, and therefore have an
industrial structure that facilitates relatively easy collective action.38
Lastly, rentier state theories contended that when governments
gain most of their revenues from external sources, such as resource
rents or foreign assistance, they are freed from the need to levy
domestic taxes and become less accountable to the societies they
govern.39 Countries dependent on the same export or activity are
likely to be characterized by a particular type of institutional
34 Mahdavy, supra note 33, at 443.
35 Robinson et al., supra note 12, at 450.
36 See ROBERTBATES, TOWARDS A POLITICALECONOMY OFDEVELOPMENT:
A RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (1988); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVEACTION AND THE THEORY OFGROUPS (1965).
37 The paradigmatic example is the resource-poor East Asian nations moving
away from import-substitution industrialization, while the resource-rich Latin
American nations failed to change their industrial policy. See Ross, The Political
Economy of the Resource Curse, supra note 19, at 311.
38 See D. MICHAEL SHAFER, WINNERS AND LOSERS: HOW SECTORS SHAPE
THEDEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF STATES 2–3, 10, 25 (1994).
39 KARL, supra note 1, at 16; Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource,
supra note 19, at 312. But see John Waterbury, Democracy Without Democrats?
The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East, in DEMOCRACY
WITHOUT DEMOCRATS? THE RENEWAL OF POLITICS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD 29
(Ghassan Salamé ed., 1994) (“[N]either historically nor in the twentieth century
is there much evidence [in theMiddle East] that taxation has evoked demands that
governments account for their use of tax monies. Predatory taxation has produced
revolts, especially in the countryside, but there has been no translation of tax
burden into pressures for democratization.”).
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isomorphism40 focusing on the organization of the state apparatus.41
As a result, “the origins of a state’s revenues reveal the links among
modes of economic development, the transformation of political
institutions, the shaping of preferences, and, ultimately, the capacity
of states to design or alter their development trajectories.”42
A variety of rentier state theories emphasize different causal
mechanisms linking resource rents and poor economic governance.
Hussein Mahdavy, who first advanced the rentier state concept,
argues that resource rents make state officials both myopic and risk-
averse.43 Hootan Shambayati suggests that rentier states face little
social pressure to improve their economic policies because their low
taxes and generous welfare programs discourage opposition groups
from mobilizing around economic issues.44 Kiren Aziz Chaudhry
suggests that rentier states develop poor extractive institutions and
therefore lack the information they need to formulate sound
development strategies.45 Lisa Anderson argues that rentier states
adopt exceptionally risk-averse policies, favoring egalitarian current
consumption over development policies that, while furthering social
and economic transformation, risk provoking social conflict.46
Despite their nuances, these theories share two fundamental
claims: first, that states are revenue satisficers rather than revenue
maximizers; and second, a state’s demand for revenues is positively
40 See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48
AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147 (1983) (describing institutional isomorphism as a
phenomenon in which institutional and organizational fields become homogenous
to one another with respect to structure, culture, and output as a result of individual
efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint).
41 KARL, supra note 1, at 13.
42 Id. at 222.
43 Mahdavy, supra note 33, at 443.
44 See generallyHootan Shambayati, The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and
the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran, 26 COMP. POL.
307 (1994).
45 See generally Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Business and
State in Labor Remittance and Oil Economies, 40 INT’LORG. 101 (1989).
46 See generally Lisa Anderson, The State in the Middle East and North
Africa, 20 COMP. POL. 1 (1987).
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correlated with the soundness of its economic policies.47 The state’s
rent-seeking behavior dominates both the political and economic
logics of the state.48 As a result, the state’s jurisdiction is expanded
while its authority is weakened by increasing the opportunities for
both public and private actors to engage in rent-seeking.49 The
institutionalization of rent-seeking, coupled with a lack of political
accountability and weak alternative sources of authority, produces a
set of state interests that are set on protecting the state’s revenue base
and advancing policies focused on interests that will perpetuate the
status quo.50 Thus, rentier states have been characterized by
significant misallocations of state resources, unsustainable budgets,
bloated public sectors, and other forms of patronage and clientelism
that are utilized as means of regime survival.51
As a result, the literature has overwhelmingly emphasized the
primacies of strong institutions and good governance as bulwarks
against the resource curse.52 In fact, Terry Lynn Karl notes that the
institutional characteristics of the rentier state are essentially
inevitable unless significant state building has occurred prior to the
introduction of the export activity.53 However, the mantra of
“institutions matter”54 is unsatisfying on several fronts. Institutions
and governance are conceptually unwieldy and can be
operationalized in multitudinous ways.55 Second, highly abstract
47 Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, supra note 19, at 313–
14.
48 KARL, supra note 1, at 15.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 16, 227.
51 Robinson et al., supra note 12, at 448–50, 466; KARL, supra note 1, at
268–69.
52 See Robinson et al., supra note 12 at 447; ROSS, TIMBER BOOMS AND
INSTITUTIONALBREAKDOWN, supra note 11, at 298; Sachs, supra note 32, at 190–
91; Jeffrey A. Frankel, The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15836, 2010).
53 KARL, supra note 1, at 13.
54 See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC
HISTORY (1980); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) [hereinafter NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE].
55 “Most of the work on governance appears satisfied with a description or
provision of a shopping list of ingredients for good governance . . . . [s]uch
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analysis neglects specific features of institutional design necessary
to mitigate the resource curse, both in terms of the origin of the
institution and its implementation in particular resource-rich
nations. Noting these limitations, the literature has approached the
question of institutional solutions to the resource curse on both
international and domestic fronts.
B. International Institutions: Transparency Through
Corporate Social Responsibility
Grounded in the human rights literature, scholars contend that
international institutions that regulate access to information
pertaining to natural resources serve to mitigate the resource curse,
particularly the sociopolitical conflicts and human rights violations
associated with resource-rich states.56 A number of conflicts are
funded by revenues from natural resources—so-called conflict
minerals.57 Accordingly, simply limiting the access to disputed
resources can decrease the motivation and funding for such
conflicts.58 The lion’s share of international institutions that have
focused on extractive industries have done so through corporate
social responsibility frameworks focused on increased information
[as] . . . accountability, transparency, anti-corruption, rule of law, advancement
for women, democracy, and decentralization.” Francis N. Botchway, Good
Governance: The Old, the New, the Principle, and the Elements, 13 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 159, 161 (2001).
56 See, e.g., Matthew Genasci & Sarah Pray, Extracting Accountability: The
Implications of the Resource Curse for CSR Theory and Practice, 11 YALEHUM.
RTS. & DEV. L. J. 37 (2008); Patrick J. Keenan, International Institutions and the
Resource Curse, 3 PA. ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 216 (2014); Lesley Wexler,
Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the Blood
Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZOL.REV. 1717 (2010); AnnieWallis,DataMining:
Lessons from the Kimberley Process for the United Nations’ Development of
Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations, 4 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 388 (2005).
57 See Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, Natural Resources and Conflict: What We
Can Do, in NATURAL RESOURCES AND VIOLENT CONFLICT: OPTIONS AND
ACTIONS 1, 4–7 (Ian Bannon & Paul Collier eds., 2003); Wexler, supra note 56,
at 1724–26.
58 Wexler, supra note 56, at 1728.
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and transparency in transactions involving natural resources.59 The
underlying logic of such policies is that, with greater exposure of the
financial relationships between states and extractive industries,
citizens gain access to information that enables them to exert
pressure on their governments to allocate more resources toward
more socially ameliorative policies such as poverty alleviation.60
Additionally, consumers of these resources may elect to not
purchase from firms operating in countries with a history of human
rights violations; accordingly, in order to sustain their business,
these firms may also pressure governments.61
To this end, a number of international regulatory regimes and
institutions have been created. The Kimberley Process,62 a global
certification scheme designed to drive blood diamonds off the legal
market, has been described as a “model for the governance of other
commodities for which there is significant inadvertent funding of
conflict”63 and as an exemplar for international action on
humanitarian and security problems.64 Sections 1502 and 1504 of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
have recently blurred the lines between securities regulations and
human rights law.65 Section 1502 imposes a new reporting
requirement on publicly traded companies that manufacture
products using certain conflict minerals.66 Companies must identify
59 See id. at 1740–41.
60 See, e.g., HALINA WARD, CORP. SOC. RESPONSIBILITY PRACTICE OF THE
WORLD BANK GRP., PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES IN STRENGTHENING CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: TAKING STOCK 8 (Jan. 2004),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/548301468313740636/pdf/346560C
SR1Taking1Stock.pdf.
61 The most well known case pertains to “blood diamonds” or “conflict
diamonds.” See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 56.
62 See id.
63 Id. at 1720; see also Bannon & Collier, supra note 57, at 1, 13.
64 Andrew Bone, Conflict Diamonds: The De Beers Group and the
Kimberley Process, in BUSINESS AND SECURITY: PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR
RELATIONSHIPS IN A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 129 (Alyson J. K. Bailes &
Isabel Frommelt eds., 2004); Wallis, supra note 56, at 388.
65 See generallyGalit A. Sarfaty,Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation,
54 VA. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013).
66 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1502, 15
U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2016).
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whether the sourcing of the minerals originated in the Democratic
Republic of Congo and bordering countries.67 If so, they must
submit an independent private sector audit report on due diligence
measures taken to determine whether those conflict minerals
directly or indirectly financed or benefited armed groups in the
covered countries.68 Section 1504 requires natural resources
companies to disclose certain payments made to governments for
the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.69
Although the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia vacated Section 1504 in 2013,70 the provision reinforced
the global standard outlined by the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (“EITI”), a multi-stakeholder coalition that
promotes revenue transparency through government legislation.71
Countries that commit to implementing EITI require all extractive
companies operating within that country to report their oil, gas, and
mining payments, which are then compared against reported
receipts from the government and made public.72
These international institutional solutions to the resource curse
are limited on several fronts. Many present problems with respect to
enforcement, particularly due to their voluntary nature.73 Given that
rentier states adopt a policy framework that seeks to preserve the
status quo and perpetuate rent-seeking, it is inherently
counterintuitive for them to self-select into a set of rules that seeks
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. § 1504; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(q).
70 Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C.
2013).
71 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, http://eiti.org/ (last
visited June 7, 2016); see Peter Eigen, Fighting Corruption in a Global Economy:
Transparency Initiatives in the Oil and Gas Industry, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 327
(2007); Genasci & Pray, supra note 56; Virginia Haufler, Disclosure as
Governance: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Resource
Management in the Developing World, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 53 (2010).
72 Genasci & Pray, supra note 56, at 51.
73 See, e.g., Eli G. Burton, Reverse the Curse: Creating a Framework to
Mitigate the Resource Curse and Promote Human Rights in Mineral Extraction
Industries in Africa, 28 EMORY INT’L L. REV 425, 434 (2014) (identifying
enforcement issues with the Kimberley Process).
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to affect change in natural resource-rich states.74 However, even in
instances where rentier states voluntarily adopt these institutions,
there may be a fundamental disjunction between being party to such
agreements and institutions, on one hand, and the extent of actual
commitment, on the other hand. States often adopt a “politics of the
mirror” where aid partners and international actors are placated by
state elites who give the impression of reform but instead devote
financial resources to private accumulation and violent preservation
of power.75
Critics of international institutions also point to an improper
focus of these regimes that ultimately limits the likelihood of
institutional change in resource-rich countries. Corporate social
responsibility agendas reflect the agendas of stakeholders in high-
income countries, particularly the legal and reputational risks of
Western corporations; accordingly, these institutions simply do not
address the most salient of problems in resource-rich countries.76
Some critics have also argued that such institutions erode the very
concept of sovereignty, and are nothing more than neo-colonialism
under another name, as these institutions advocate foreign intrusion
into what should be purely domestic concerns.77 Although this is
generally used as a normative critique, it is also problematic on a
positive front, as these frameworks are unlikely to be tailored to the
specific national contexts of each country, and thus may struggle in
being successfully implemented.78 Given these issues with
international institutional approaches to the resource curse, scholars
have also suggested domestic institutional reforms in the form of
74 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
75 PATRICKCHABAL&JEAN-PASCALDALOZ, AFRICAWORKS: DISORDER AS
POLITICAL INSTRUMENT 117 (1999).
76 See Genasci & Pray, supra note 56, at 41; Lisa J. Laplante & Suzanne A.
Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in
the Extractive Sector, 11 YALEHUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 82–84 (2008).
77 See Keenan, supra note 56, at 255.
78 Id. at 255–56 (noting that “countries expect to have unchallenged authority
over their domestic affairs, including the use of natural resources found in their
territory”). But see W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in
Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866 (1990) (arguing that the
advent of universal human rights norms has modified traditional conceptions of
sovereignty).
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natural resource funds (“NRFs”), revenue distribution arrangements
(“RDAs”), and intergovernmental fiscal relations (“IGFR”).
C. An Alphabet Soup of Domestic Institutions: NRFs,
RDAs, and IGFR
1. Natural Resource Funds (NRFs)
NRFs have emerged as pragmatic, domestic institutional tools
that can help mitigate, avoid, or reverse the resource curse.79 NRFs
can take a variety of forms, ranging from independent institutions
characterized by a high degree of discretion and autonomy to funds
that exist as government accounts.80 NRFs aim to create a trust or
trust-like institution that collects a share of government revenue
from the exploitation of natural resources that can be used to fund
public outlays in the indefinite future.81 Generally, NRFs are
controlled and managed as stabilization funds that aim to smooth
expenditures and mitigate the effects of revenue volatility associated
with natural resources or savings funds that create intergenerational
stores of wealth.82
Theoretically, NRFs commit states to adopting more sound
fiscal policies and reduce corruption by placing limitations on the
natural resource revenue directed to the fund or placing them out of
reach entirely.83 The NRF acts as a surrogate for a rentier state’s
79 See, e.g., Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-Economic
Development in Nigeria: The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds, 30 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 121, 169–70 (2004) [hereinafter Duruigbo, Managing Oil
Revenues] (“Lately, trust funds have been attracting attention in academic and
policy circles as pragmatic tools for addressing the unfortunate predicament
generally manifesting in entities blessed with natural resources, especially oil.”).
80 Jeffrey Davis et al., Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable
Resources: Experience and Fiscal Policy Implications, in FISCAL POLICY
FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES 273 (J.M.
Davis et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter Davis et al., Stabilization and Savings Funds
for Nonrenewable Resources].
81 Sachs, supra note 32, at 189; see also Davis et al., Stabilization and
Savings Funds of Nonrenewable Resources, supra note 80, at 273–74.
82 Davis et al., Stabilization and Savings Funds of Nonrenewable Resources,
supra note 80, at 274.
83 Karl, Ensuring Fairness, supra note 31, at 293–94.
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weak formal institutions, is managed by multiple apolitical
stakeholders,84 and is designed as an independent and transparent
institution85 that is tailored to local context.86 Despite popular belief
in their utility, however, scholarship on NRFs does not find evidence
that funds lead to better management of natural resources.87 This
poor empirical relationship can be explained by omitted variable
bias88—namely, that the economic logic used to justify the use of
NRFs is insufficient to show the necessity of the funds.89
Instead, the potential value of NRFs is institutional. NRFs affect
the political incentives facing policymakers and constrain behavior
otherwise focused on myopia.90 Policymakers have strong political
incentives to follow suboptimal economic policies because the
competition for power among different groups can create perverse
incentives to overspend in the short-run, even if there is a more
stable time path for spending that all groups would prefer.91 NRFs
address the political incentive problem in three ways. First, NRFs
can be set up with rules that govern the magnitude and composition
of spending from the fund to improve the regularity and consistency
84 Stephen D. Krasner, Troubled Societies, Outlaw States, and Gradations of
Sovereignty 41 (July 20, 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); cf.
Macartan Humphreys & Martin E. Sandbu, The Political Economy of Natural
Resource Funds, in ESCAPING THERESOURCECURSE, supra note 14, at 194, 219.
85 Joseph C. Bell & Teresa Maurea Faria, Critical Issues for a Revenue
Management Law, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE, supra note 14, at 286,
287–88; Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84, at 220–21.
86 Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84, at 214.
87 Id. at 195.
88 In econometrics, omitted variable bias occurs when the omission of a
variable from a regression that affects the dependent variable becomes part of the
error term and, as a result, there is a potential violation of the assumption for the
minimum sum of squared errors criterion to be unbiased. See Alan O. Sykes, An
Introduction to Regression Analysis 25 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 20, 1993). Additionally, if the omitted variable is correlated
with included variables, the coefficients of included variables will also be biased.
See ERICA. HANUSHEK& JOHN E. JACKSON, STATISTICALMETHODS FOR SOCIAL
SCIENTISTS 81–82 (1977); J. JOHNSTON, ECONOMETRICMETHODS 168–69 (2d ed.
1972).
89 Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84, at 195.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 200.
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of policy.92 Second, NRFs impose a separation, or sharing, of
decision-making authority.93 Lastly, NRFs provide information to
citizens and, as a result, encourage greater governmental
accountability and more efficient policy outcomes.94
The paragon of NRFs is undoubtedly the Government Pension
Fund of Norway (“GPF”).95 The GPF was established in 1990 as the
Petroleum Fund of Norway and renamed in 2006.96 It was
established as a fiscal policy tool to support long-term management
of petroleum revenues and transparency in their subsequent use.97
The GPF operates both as a stabilization and as a savings fund, the
latter particularly focused on helping the Norwegian government
cope with the costs associated with an aging population and rising
pension costs.98 Rather than having a separate legal persona, the
GPF is part of the Norwegian state apparatus and managed by
Norges Bank, the Norwegian Central Bank, and the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance.99 Operationally, the GPF receives all net oil
revenues and “finances the budget’s non-oil deficit through a
reverse transfer.”100 One of the most lauded characteristics of the
GPF is its transparency:
92 Id. at 214.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Wealth Funds As Regulatory
Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global
Governance Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 425, 452
(2010).
96 The Fund, NORGES BANK INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.nbim.no/en/the-fund/about-the-fund/. The fund was not activated
until 1995, when an overall budget surplus was reached. See Davis et al.,
Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable Resources, supra note 80, at
303.
97 Backer, supra note 95, at 450–51; Martin Skancke, Fiscal Policy and
Petroleum Fund Management in Norway, in FISCAL POLICY FORMULATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION INOIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, supra note 80, at 316, 320.
98 Davis et al., Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable
Resources, supra note 80, at 283; Skancke, supra note 97, at 316–17.
99 Backer, supra note 95, at 451–52.
100 Davis et al., Stabilization and Savings Funds for Nonrenewable
Resources, supra note 80, at 286.
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[t]he International Monetary Fund indicates that
[Norway’s] Ministry of Finance . . . reports regularly
on the governance framework, the fund’s goals,
investment strategy and results, and ethical
guidelines. The Central Bank—the fund’s
operational manager—publishes quarterly and
annual reports on the management of the fund,
including its performance and an annual listing of all
investments. Detailed information on the fund’s
voting in shareholders’meetings is also published.101
Thus, the institutional design of the GPF counterbalances the
incentive structures built into rentier states by encouraging
government accountability and efficient use of natural resource
revenues.
The utility of NRFs has, however, been criticized with respect
to their viability in developing countries with weaker institutions.102
NRFs only work if they are managed in ways that are wholly
uncharacteristic of rentier states: strict adherence to the rule of law,
intertemporal stability, an emphasis on intergenerational wealth, a
low discount rate in respect to the future, immunity from political
and rent-seeking pressures, and political will.103 Accordingly, the
institutional design of NRFs represents their core limitation in the
developing world. In countries with weak institutions, funds that
have been modeled after Norway’s GPF have been characterized by
highly malleable fund rules, a dearth of accountability mechanisms,
and high incidences of policy reversal.104 Accordingly:
[t]he central lesson that Norway’s experience
provides other oil exporters and natural resource-
101 Delia Velculescu, IMF Survey: Norway’s Oil Fund Shows the Way for
Wealth Funds, IMF SURV. MAG. (July 9, 2008), http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/POL070908A.htm.
102 Michael L. Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, in
ESCAPING THERESOURCECURSE, supra note 14, at 237, 243–44 [hereinafter Ross,
How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality].
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84, at 243; Jeffrey Davis et
al., Oil Funds: Problems Posing as Solutions, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2001,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/12/davis.htm; Ross, How
Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, supra note 102, at 243.
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dependent countries is that structure matters . . . .
Where appropriate institutions are in place, a state
has considerably good prospects of managing the
commencement of oil development and greater
capacity to handle booms that occur thereafter.105
Ultimately, the specific institutional design features are the critical
causal variables in explaining the success or failure of natural
resource revenue allocation mechanisms.
Chad’s NRF experience as part of the Chad-Cameroon Oil
Pipeline project is illustrative of the extant critiques of domestic
institutional solutions to the resource curse. In 1988, the Chadian
government had entered into a concession agreement with a
consortium of oil companies “to develop . . . oil fields and extract
crude oil.”106 Due to its landlocked character, Chad entered into a
bilateral agreement with Cameroon in 1996 to construct and operate
a 1,070-kilometer pipeline in order to export the oil to international
markets.107 The pipeline was the largest private sector investment
project ever constructed in sub-Saharan Africa.108 However,
because of the high risk associated with such a major project in a
poorly institutionalized state, one member of the consortium,
ExxonMobil, refused to participate without the support of theWorld
Bank.109
The World Bank conditioned the loan agreement on Chad’s
approval of a Revenue Management Law (“RML”), designed to
prevent Chadian government officials from misallocating oil
105 Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of
Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 86
(2006) [hereinafter Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty].
106 S.A. BRONKHORST, LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND THE
WORLD BANK’S CHAD-CAMEROON OIL AND PIPELINE PROJECT 8 (S.A.
Bronkhorst ed., 2000).
107 Emeka Duruigbo, The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and
the Resource Curse in Africa, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1, 38–39 (2005)
[hereinafter Duruigbo, The World Bank].
108 CLAUDIA FRANK & LENA GUESNET, “WE WERE PROMISED
DEVELOPMENT AND ALL WE GOT WAS MISERY”—THE INFLUENCE OF
PETROLEUM ONCONFLICTDYNAMICS INCHAD 25 (2010).
109 SeeGenoveva Hernández Uriz, The Application of World Bank Standards
to the Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group Promote Corporate
Responsibility, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 77, 93 (2002).
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revenue.110 The RML was codified in Chadian Law 001.111 The
RML specified that oil royalties were to be deposited into an
offshore escrow account that saved 10 percent for future
generations.112 Of the balance of royalty revenue, 80 percent was
earmarked for priority sectors—public health, social affairs,
education, rural development, infrastructure, the environment, and
water resources.113 “[F]ifteen percent [of the balance] was set aside
for the state’s recurring . . . cost, and the remaining five percent was
to be spent on development in the oil-producing Doba region.”114 In
order to monitor the allocation of monies and fund spending, “the
RML also established the PetroleumRevenue Oversight and Control
Committee” (“the Collège”), comprised “of representatives from the
judiciary, government, and civil society.”115 The project became the
“most significant, and most closely watched, experiment designed
to change the pattern of the ‘oil curse’ and promote poverty
reduction through targeted use of oil revenues.”116
From its inception, the design of the RML has been highly
criticized, and these flaws were ultimately exploited to undermine
the project’s success.117 Approximately less than half of Chadian oil
revenue was not covered by the allocation and oversight
110 Loan Agreement (Petroleum Pipeline Development Project) Between
Republic of Chad and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
sched. 5, Chad–Int’l Bank Reconstr. & Dev., Mar. 19, 2001,
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01210/WEB/IMAGES/TD_LA_EN.P
DF.
111 NAT’L ASSEMBLY Law No. 001/PR/99 of January 11, 1999 on the
Petroleum Revenue Management (Chad) [hereinafter RML]; see also Dustin N.
Sharp, Requiem for a Pipedream: Oil, the World Bank, and the Need for Human
Rights Assessments, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 379, 390 (2011).
112 RML, supra note 111, § 2, art. 9; Sharp, supra note 111, at 390.
113 RML, supra note 111, § 2, art. 8(c).
114 Annalisa M. Leibold, Aligning Incentives for Development: The World
Bank and the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 167, 175 (2011).
115 Id.; see RML, supra note 111, § 1, arts. 15, 18.
116 IANGARY&TERRYLYNNKARL, BOTTOMOF THEBARREL: AFRICA’SOIL
BOOM AND THE POOR 60 (2003).
117 See id. at 68; Duruigbo, TheWorld Bank, supra note 107, at 43–46; Sharp,
supra note 111, at 391; Genoveva Hernández Uriz, To Lend or Not to Lend: Oil,
Human Rights, and the World Bank’s Internal Contradictions, 14 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 197, 223 (2001).
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mechanisms of the RML based on the statutory language.118 For
instance, “the spending [restrictions] covered only direct
profits . . . [defined as] the government’s share of the dividends and
royalties, excluding taxes, customs, and other duties.”119 Tax
revenue and signing bonuses were exempt from the RML.120 The
RML could also be changed by presidential decree.121 This became
problematic in 2006 when President Idris Déby signed a law that
included national security as a priority sector under RML in order to
increase military spending in the eastern provinces bordering the
Darfur region of Sudan.122 The government also abolished the part
of the fund devoted to saving for future generations, effectively
completing the policy reversal.123
In addition to the weaknesses of the enacting statute, the Collège
was designed to be weak and woefully inadequate at undertaking its
monitoring support. The Collège suffered from limitations on its
enforcement powers,124 inadequate resources,125 and an unclear
mandate.126 Importantly, the procedure for removing members of
the Collège was easy, which “made it particularly susceptible to
political manipulation.”127 The Chadian state was able to retain
118 Sharp, supra note 111, at 391.
119 Leibold, supra note 114, at 75; see RML, supra note 111, § 1, arts. 3–4.
120 RML, supra note 111, § 1, arts. 2–4.
121 Id. § 2, art. 8; Uriz, supra note 117, at 223.
122 Han van Dijk, Political Deadlock in Chad, 106 AFR. AFF. 697, 697–99
(2007). The Chadian government also spent part of its signing bonus on arms
purchases. See GARY&KARL, supra note 116, at 70.
123 van Dijk, supra note 122, at 698–99; Paul Blustein,Chad Pipeline Project
Steeped in Controversy: World Bank Reconsiders Role as Nation looks at Altering
Terms, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 28, 2005),
http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Chad-pipeline-project-steeped-in-
controversy-1569643.php.
124 KORRINA HORTA ET AL., THE CHAD-CAMEROON OIL & PIPELINE
PROJECT: A PROJECTNON-COMPLETIONREPORT 12 (2007).
125 LISA MARGONELLI, OIL ON THE BRAIN: PETROLEUM’S LONG, STRANGE
TRIP TOYOUR TANK 181 (2007).
126 GARY&KARL, supra note 116, at 70–72.
127 Id. at 72 (discussing Chad’s removal of Amine Ben Bark from from his
position as president of the Revenue Oversight Committee); Alexandros
Zervos, Linking Natural Resource Exploitation and Primary Health Care in
Developing Countries, 11 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGNAFF. 227, 253 (2006).
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considerable control over its natural resource revenues and
perpetuate rent-seeking behavior due to the poor institutional design
of the RML and the capacity for policy reversal.
2. Revenue Distribution Arrangements (RDAs)
By comparison, RDAs directly transfer revenue from the sale of
natural resources to the citizens of that country.128 The underlying
logic of RDAs is based on normative claims focusing on the
recognition that nationals of a country are the “true and legitimate
owners” of natural resources contained in their country.129
Supporters also turn to political economic arguments that direct
transfers to citizens will deprive governments of the opportunity to
misallocate resources and thus reduce rent-seeking and
corruption.130 Positive economic arguments hold that direct transfers
develop credit markets and foster entrepreneurship and economic
growth.131 Additionally, RDAs can potentially make the
government dependent on taxes rather than resource rents, the
underlying causal mechanism of rentier state theory.132 Michael L.
Ross points out some of the benefits of cash transfers: they provide
for more equitable rent distribution; allow individuals, who are in a
better position than governments, to decide the optimal way to spend
the rents and make spending choices; prevent corruption and rent-
seeking because rents are spared from politicians’ control; and can
be tied to complementary social goals, such as child immunization
or increasing primary and secondary school enrollment.133 There are
only a few RDAs currently implemented. Both Alaska and Alberta
utilize direct distribution agreements to much success, and recent
128 Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 17, 19.
129 Id. at 17.
130 Id.; Sachs, supra note 32, at 188. A similar argument is proffered in
support of foreign aid targeted at the grassroots level. See generally WILLIAM
EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN (2006); WHAT WORKS IN
DEVELOPMENT? THINKING BIG AND THINKING SMALL (Jessica Cohen & William
Easterly eds., 2009).
131 See Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 105, at 80.
132 Id.; see also supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
133 Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, supra note 102,
at 243.
CONSTITUTIONS AS COUNTER-CURSES 313
scholarship has argued that other countries—most notably Iraq—
should adopt direct distribution plans.134
RDAs have been criticized on three grounds. First, direct cash
transfers to citizens reduce the amount of funds available for the
provision of public goods, particularly infrastructure and social
service delivery.135 This is particularly problematic in poor
countries, where public investment rather than private consumption
spending is typically needed to foment economic development and
growth and, consequently, break the country out of a poverty trap.136
Second, like NRFs, RDAs depend on proper institutional
management and design, which is generally in tension with rentier
states.137 Generally, other forms of specialized commodity funds
established in developing countries have failed to function well.138
Lastly, there is the possibility of generating a “rentier mentality,”
which “predisposes citizens to an indolent attitude of waiting for
checks from the government as a substitute for productive economic
activity.”139
3. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations (IGFR)
A third institutional solution for managing natural resource
revenues is to divide revenues between national and subnational
governments through fiscal federalism mechanisms.140 Outside of
134 See id.
135 Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 105, at 81.
136 See Sachs, supra note 32, at 177, 188–89.
137 See Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, supra note
102, at 243–44.
138 See Davis et al., Stabilization and Savings Funds of Nonrenewable
Resources, supra note 80; Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84; Ross, How
Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, supra note 102.
139 Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 105, at 81 (contending that
the magnitude of the distribution may not be large enough to foment such
behavior); see also DOUGLAS A. YATES, THE RENTIER STATE IN AFRICA: OIL
RENT DEPENDENCY AND NEOCOLONIALISM IN THE REPUBLIC OF GABON 21–22
(1996).
140 Such mechanisms can be operationalized through the concept of
subnational fiscal autonomy, or the “set of fiscal relationships between the
autonomous levels of government in a single country,” and can be broadly
characterized by how independent subnational governments are from national
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the Middle East, there is a global trend of decentralizing revenues,
regardless of whether the state is unitary or federal.141 The main
arguments in favor of these mechanisms focus on providing for
ownership of natural resources at the subnational level and
compensation for the social, environmental, and infrastructural cost
of natural resource extraction.142 Revenue sharing has also been
used as a political tool to appease secessionist tensions in resource-
producing areas.143
In contrast, critics of fiscal decentralization of natural resource
revenue point to the relative higher capacity of central governments.
Central governments are more insulated from revenue volatility,
absorb new investments from windfall spending, and better
implement countercyclical fiscal policies.144 Central governments
can contribute to horizontal equity between subnational units by
redistributing natural resource revenue between resource-rich and
resource-poor units.145 Furthermore, and perhaps most important in
the context of this Article, fiscal discipline is often worse at the
subnational level than the central level.146 Decentralizing revenues
does not imply a circumvention of the rent-seeking state apparatus
governments over their revenues, their spending, and their capacity to enter into
contracts. J. TYLERDICKOVICK, DECENTRALIZATION AND RECENTRALIZATION IN
THE DEVELOPING WORLD: COMPARATIVE STUDIES FROM AFRICA AND LATIN
AMERICA ANDAFRICA 3–5 (2011).
141 See Ehtisham Ahmad & Eric Mottu, Oil Revenue Assignments: Country
Experiences and Issues, in FISCAL POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
IN OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, supra note 80, at 216, 216–17; Giorgio Brosio,
Oil Revenue and Fiscal Federalism, in FISCAL POLICY FORMULATION AND
IMPLEMENTATION INOIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, supra note 80, at 243, 243.
142 Ahmad & Mottu, supra note 141, at 217; Ross, How Mineral-Rich States
Can Reduce Inequality, supra note 102, at 249.
143 Ahmad & Mottu, supra note 141, at 217.
144 Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, supra note 102,
at 248–49. Countercyclical fiscal policies are those policies relating to
government spending and taxation that work against the current state of the
economy (i.e., a reduction of spending and increase in taxation during a boom
period and an increase in spending and cutting of taxes during a recession). Id. at
249.
145 Ahmad & Mottu, supra note 141, at 217.
146 Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, supra note 102,
at 266.
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or the trickling down of revenue to the household level.147 Natural
resource revenue may remain in the hands of corrupt, rent-seeking
actors—simply at another level of government. In these instances,
the same kind of institutional concerns expressed with respect to
NRFs and RDAs exist in fiscal federalism arrangements.
Given the poor institutionalization of rentier states, the critical
question becomes whether successful revenue allocation
institutions, such as those in Norway and Alaska, can be used to
realign incentives in a way to make them self-enforcing.148
Identifying a mechanism for a state to constrain its present behavior
and make a credible commitment to future action is integral to
answering this question in the affirmative. The following Part
introduces principles from comparative constitutional design to
identify how such a credible commitment can be made to create self-
enforcing natural resource revenue allocation institutions to assist in
mitigating the resource curse.
II. CONSTITUTIONS, COMMITMENT, ANDCOORDINATION
A. Theory of Constitutional Credible Commitment
Using natural resource revenue allocation institutions created by
statute to manage the resource curse in poorly institutionalized,
resource-rich countries is problematic due to the absence of
mechanisms to deter future policy reversal. This question fits into a
larger framework of establishing credible commitments that bind
actors across time and enable more complex contracting and
transactions to occur.149 Douglass North and Barry Weingast
emphasize that a critical political factor is the degree to which the
regime or sovereign is committed or bound to the existing rules:
147 See generally id.
148 Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84, at 226.
149 NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 54, at 50–51; Daron
Acemoglu et al., Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in 1A
HANDBOOK ECON. GROWTH 386, 386 (Phillippe Aghion & Steven N. Durlauf
eds., 2005); Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 808 (1989).
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Rules the sovereign can readily revise differ
significantly in their implications for performance
from exactly the same rules when not subject to
revision. The more likely it is that the sovereign will
alter property rights for his or her own benefit, the
lower the expected returns from investment and the
lower in turn the incentive to invest.150
Accordingly, identifying structures that provide mechanisms for
credible commitment is imperative for institutional design scholars.
Constitutions, particularly constitutional protection of natural
resource revenue allocation institutions, provide such a credible
commitment. Such a solution is preferable to international
institutions and revenue-based domestic institutions created by
statute. Constitutions are useful in mitigating the resource curse,
particularly in poorly institutionalized countries, through two
mechanisms. First, constitutions serve as precommitment151
mechanisms that bind future generations of citizens to
predetermined institutional forms through which politics is
practiced.152 By limiting the actions available to future state elites,
constitutions increase the likelihood that revenue allocation
institutions will remain implemented and substantively
unchanged.153 Second, constitutions are coordination mechanisms,
operating as a “focal equilibrium,” a set of functional governance
150 North & Weingast, supra note 149, at 808.
151 Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law:
Starting a Conversation, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2057 (2003).
152 ANDRÁS SAJÓ, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONSTITUTIONALISM 8 (1999); Tom Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diffusion:
How andWhy National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. 201, 202 (2008); see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1984) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES AND
THE SIRENS]; Jon Elster, Intemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE
OVER TIME 35, 35 (George Lowenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) [hereinafter
Elster, Intemporal Choice and Political Thought].
153 See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 85–86
(2002); Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and
International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 710–11 (2006).
CONSTITUTIONS AS COUNTER-CURSES 317
structures to which all groups will acquiesce.154 In doing so,
constitutions impose high costs on actors that seek to alter the
existing equilibrium, entrenching the existing institutional
arrangement.155 In heterogeneous societies characterized by high
degrees of intergroup conflict, higher collective action costs
associated with re-coordination are even more pronounced, creating
further institutional stability at the constitutionally created
equilibrium.156 Ultimately, constitutionally protected natural
resource revenue allocation institutions can endure and succeed
because the coordination costs associated with changing the
institutions are considerably higher than if they were created by
statute.
Precommitment means “becoming committed, bound, or
obligated to some course of action or inaction or to some constraint
on future action . . .to influence someone else’s choices.”157
Precommitment is principally undertaken to restrain oneself from
action that one would otherwise do because such restraint represents
a welfare improvement.158 Restraint stems from a concern that one’s
passions, self-interest, preferences, or method of discounting time
will cause one to do something in the future that is deleterious to
one’s welfare.159 The political logic of precommitment is the need
for a political actor to make a credible promise, both because the
citizenry may be reluctant to trust the promise due to changes in
circumstances and because the future incentives of the political actor
are unknown.160 To paraphrase Stephen Holmes, people will not
154 Barry R.Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule
of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 258 (1997) [hereinafter Weingast, The
Political Foundations of Democracy].
155 See Carey, supra note 6, at 754.
156 See RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 15–17 (1999).
157 THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER
ESSAYS 1 (2006).
158 Ratner, supra note 151, at 2057.
159 See ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS, supra note 152, at 37–47.
160 See Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The
Political Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL& THEORETICAL
ECON. 286, 288 (1993) [hereinafter Weingast, Constitutions as Governance
Structures]; see, e.g., Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy, supra
note 154, at 259 (1997).
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believe their leader when sober, knowing that sometimes leaders can
become drunk and behave quite differently.161
Constitutions have been identified as “precommitment
strategies:”
[b]y enshrining various aspects of procedure or
substance in a written document that announces itself
as the supreme source of law, and by making that
document difficult to change, a people can achieve a
future better than any they could otherwise
attain . . . .On this view, a constitutionally-bound
government acquires capacity it would not otherwise
have by effectively restraining itself.162
Constitutions, which constrain choices to be made at a later time,
help resolve current political problems through facilitating a stable
political order in the future and creating durable institutions that are
not susceptible to significant change over time.163 These
commitments are made credible by “imposing [political and social]
costs on those who violate promises.”164 By binding themselves to
the mast, “political actors actually can enhance their own
authority.”165 Credible commitments via constitutional provisions
confer benefits by both constraining state elites as well as the power
of the people.166 Though seemingly counterintuitive, constraining
the democratic process at times is useful for institutional stability as
it can insulate institutions against short-run, particularistic interests
that may not be in the best interest of the nation.167
161 Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds.,
1988); see also STEPHENHOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY
OF LIBERALDEMOCRACY 134–77 (1995).
162 John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1929 (2003).
163 Ginsburg, supra note 153, at 710.
164 Id. at 722.
165 Id.
166 See Elster, Intemporal Choice and Political Thought, supra note 152, at
35, 37.
167 See Guillermo O’Donnell, Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State, 13 LATIN AM. RESEARCH REV. 3, 6–8, 27
(1978) (describing the bureaucratic-authoritarian state); see also JOSEPH
CAMILLERI, STATES, MARKETS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN ASIA PACIFIC 361 (2000)
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Constitutions are an especially strong form of precommitment
institutions because of the nature of “rights as trumps.”168 “Because
rights operate as trumps over normal government[al] interests, they
have an inherent [net social] cost.”169 Constitutionalism
communicates that the current regime is “sufficiently aware of the
long-run benefits” to bind itself to these future commitments and
“give up some of its potential power.”170 This operates as a powerful
signaling mechanism.171 Even without enforcement mechanisms,
the political signal sent by ratification may be deemed credible.172
This immediate sacrifice of short-run social, political, and economic
control always helps signal that a host country has a low discount
rate, that is, that they place a low value on the present relative to the
future. Constitutionalism suggests that a state has a time horizon that
is relatively long-run in nature. As Richard McAdams notes,
“passing up the short-term gains of opportunism may indicate an
ability to hold commitments in the face of changing impulses as
much as it indicated a low discount rate.”173
However, a theoretical emphasis on the importance of
constitutions as credible commitments also demands a focus on the
(identifying social order and bureaucratic encapsulation as means of insulating
the state apparatus from individual interests and pressure groups); ROBERTWADE,
GOVERNING THEMARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 256 (1990) (describing the developmental
state as one where “the bureaucracy directing economic development is protected
from all the most powerful interest groups so it can set and achieve long-range
industrial policies”); David Collier, Industrial Modernization and Political
Change: A Latin American Perspective, 30 WORLD POL. 593, 597 (1978)
(adopting a working definition of O’Donnell’s concept of the bureaucratic-
authoritarian state). See generally GUILLERMO O’DONNELL, MODERNIZATION
AND BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIANISM: STUDIES IN SOUTH AMERICAN
POLITICS (1973).
168 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF
RIGHTS 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
169 Id.; see also Farber, supra note 153, at 83.
170 Farber, supra note 153, at 85.
171 Id.; see also Beth A. Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with
the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE L. J. 323, 324 (2000).
172 Farber, supra note 153, at 86.
173 Id. at 93; see Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law,
Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 657–58 (2001).
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“positive puzzle of constitutional commitment.”174 If
constitutionalism is described as “Ulysses binding himself to the
mast in order to resist the fatal call of the Sirens,” then popular
majorities or other powerful political actors must be able to identify
the institutional equivalents of the ropes.175 The logic of
constitutional commitment demands two conditions: (1) incentive
compatibility, where political actors are “selectively empowered by
constitutionally-specified political decision-making arrangements”
that “have interests or incentives that are aligned with constitutional
rules or values”; and (2) institutional stability, where the
“institutional arrangements that place power in the hands of those
decisionmakers” are “relatively stable [and] not subject to revision
or subversion by the opponents of” outcomes that come as a result
of the constitution.176 Drawing on these conditions, constitutional
commitment can be operationalized through two main mechanisms:
formal institutions and coordination.
B. Operationalizing Constitutional Commitments
1. Formal Institutions
The standard and intuitive approach to operationalizing
constitutional commitment is through stable institutions. Political
communities can successfully commit by pointing the incentives of
influential constituencies in the right directions or by imposing
structural arrangements like federalism, separation of powers,
democracy, and delegation.177 At a formal level, constitutionalizing
174 Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 662 (2011).
175 Id. at 658.
176 Id. at 663.
177 See, e.g., North &Weingast, supra note 149, at 804 (attributing economic
growth in early modern England to institutional reforms growing out of the
Glorious Revolution, specifically the assertion of parliamentary control over the
fiscal powers of the monarch and the establishment of an independent judiciary
that led to the protection of property rights); see alsoDARONACEMOGLU&JAMES
A. ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 23–30
(2006) (explaining Britain’s nineteenth-century transformation from an elite
oligarchy to a broadly enfranchised democracy as a means for elites to credibly
CONSTITUTIONS AS COUNTER-CURSES 321
legal rules and institutional arrangements entrenches them against
legal change more than other rules because constitutions are more
difficult to amend.178 A considerable amount of attention has been
given to the independence of the judiciary and the power of judicial
review.179 Daryl Levinson notes that the institution of judicial
review has developed into a relatively stable and important
structural commitment device.180 Additionally, John Ferejohn and
Lawrence Sager identify structural constitutional provisions relating
to “procedures or mechanisms of governance”—including judicial
review—as “external” commitment devices that prevent majorities
from reneging on their “internal” commitments to constitutional
rights.181 Politicians can entrench policies by delegating to a
politically independent judiciary. For instance, Ran Hirschl explains
the recent emergence of constitutional judicial review in a number
of countries as a “hegemonic preservation” strategy on the part of
threatened elites.182 In instances where majoritarian democratic
movements threaten the survival of an extant regime, elites seek to
preserve their policies by entrusting them to a politically
independent judiciary that will share and protect their interests.183
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson particularly emphasize “partisan
entrenchment,” where temporarily dominant political parties lock in
their policy gains by appointing ideologically sympathetic judges
who continue to further the parties’ agendas through constitutional
law over the course of the judges’ lifetime appointments.184
commit to redistribute wealth and opportunity in order to stave off social unrest
and the threat of revolution).
178 Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 111, 123–26 (1993).
179 SeeWilliamsM. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 892 (1975).
180 Levinson, supra note 174, at 658, 661, 716.
181 Ferejohn & Sager, supra note 162, at 1945–46.
182 See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THENEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 50–56 (2007).
183 See id.
184 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L.REV. 1045, 1066–67 (2001); see alsoHoward Gillman,How
Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts
in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 511, 517 (2002)
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However, applying a strictly institutionalist approach is unsatisfying
on several fronts. First, a strictly institutional focus can result in a
lack of conceptual clarity.185 Second, and more importantly, it still
begs the question about how these institutions become impervious
to sociopolitical revision or override. This is a particularly important
issue in the context of constitutional design in countries with weak
or nonexistent institutional foundations, as stable institutions are the
ultimate objective. Unfortunately, much of the literature treats stable
institutions as objective or exogenous.186
2. Constitutions as Coordination
The coordination theory of constitutions contends that, rather
than being understood as contracts that imply mutual exchange
between parties, constitutions should be conceptualized as bargains
among competing groups.187 Under coordination theory, powerful
interest groups compete, compromise, and eventually develop a
“focal equilibrium,” a set of functional governance structures to
which all groups will acquiesce.188 If the benefits of coordination
exceed the costs of constitutional constraints, the competing actors
will have an incentive to commit themselves to maintaining the focal
point equilibrium.189 Coordination can also be effective when actors
(explaining the increased power and conservative activism of the U.S. federal
courts in the late nineteenth century as a successful effort by the Republican Party
to entrench economic policies).
185 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
186 See Barry R. Weingast, Political Institutions: Rational Choice
Perspectives, in A NEW HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 167, 175 (Robert E.
Goodin & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 1996) [hereinafter Weingast, Political
Institutions] (noting that “[m]ost studies of institutions ignore” the question of
“what makes institutions resistant to change” by “assuming that institutions are
fixed and hence cannot be altered by individuals”).
187 See HARDIN, supra note 156, at 12–18, 82–133; Adam Przeworski,
Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 161, at 59, 63–64;Weingast, Political Institutions, supra
note 186, at 257–58, 261.
188 Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy, supra note 154, at
258; Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 240 (2009).
189 Levinson, supra note 174, at 707.
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have divergent preferences.190 While each actor will prefer the
arrangement most likely to further its own interests or maximize its
individual utility, in many contexts, actors will be willing to
sacrifice their first choices of outcomes or institutions in exchange
for the benefits of avoiding conflict and agreeing on a common way
forward.191
Constitutional coordination theory suggests that maintaining
coordination around the existing focal point will always be much
easier than attempting to re-coordinate around an alternative
constitutional regime.192 This gravitation toward the existing
equilibrium is based on the cost-benefit structure built into
constitutions. A constitution is a “massive act of coordination
that . . . create[s] a convention” whose “maintenance [depends]
on . . . self-generating incentives and expectations.”193 Inherent in
conventions is “a structure that often exacts costs from anyone who
runs against the convention more or less automatically without
anyone or any institution having to take action against the rule
breaker.”194 Accordingly, the costs of defection from the extant
equilibrium—both with respect to defying the convention and the
costs of collective action associated with re-coordination—are
prohibitively high.195 Actors have incentives to acquiesce. As a
result, “coordination regime[s] tend to become more entrenched
over time”196 because, once the regime is in place, it becomes
“extremely difficult to re-coordinate large numbers on doing things
some other way.”197 In order to re-coordinate, not only must a large
number of citizens and political actors object to the old regime, but
190 SeeMcAdams, supra note 188, at 236–37.
191 See id.
192 Levinson, supra note 174, at 707–08.
193 Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 61 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, eds.
2013) [hereinafter Hardin, Why a Constitution?]; see HARDIN, supra note 156, at
111.
194 Hardin,Why a Constitution?, supra note 193, at 60.
195 See HARDIN, supra note 156, at 113.
196 Tara Leigh Grove, The Exceptions Clause As A Structural Safeguard, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 929, 943 (2013).
197 HARDIN, supra note 156, at 15.
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a sufficient number must also agree on the same alternative.198 In
heterogeneous societies, where the coordination costs are inherently
higher than homogenous societies, re-coordination is an even more
daunting and costly task.199
The political logic of coordination identifies it as an especially
strong mechanism of constitutional commitment because the
benefits of coordination and the costs of defecting and re-
coordination are the critical consideration.200 Accordingly,
coordination can occur even in the absence of strong institutions.
The benefits of constitutional compliance—namely, the creation of
a functional government that can make and enforce laws, maintain
order, foster economic prosperity, provide public goods, and
provide bundles of rights—must be viewed in its entirety as a single
unit of analysis. Thus,
[e]very time the text is ignored or obviously defied,
its ability to serve . . . as a focal point[] is
weakened . . . . [I]f one person cheats, by failing to
follow the text, others are more likely to cheat too,
and soon the ability of the text to coordinate behavior
will be lost, to everyone’s detriment.201
Accordingly, if elites ignore specific constitutional provisions
that have been determined via coordination, a high cost is incurred
because the entire system loses its equilibrium and the basic rules of
the political game fall apart. In order to preserve the
macroinstitutional stability of the regime, elites will often follow
constitutional provisions they oppose because the benefits of
coordination outweigh the costs of defection.202 Everyone needs
rules to follow, even dictators and kleptocrats.
Constitutional commitment, applied specifically to institutions
managing the resource curse, addresses the underlying issues of
statutory natural resource revenue allocation mechanisms by
substantially raising the costs of policy reversal. The utility of
natural resource revenue allocation regimes in poorly
198 See Grove, supra note 196, at 943.
199 See HARDIN, supra note 156, at 16.
200 Levinson, supra note 174, at 707.
201 David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s
Principle, 112 YALE L. J. 1717, 1734–35 (2003).
202 See Levinson, supra note 174, at 707.
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institutionalized countries is conditioned upon the endurance of their
design.203 Once rent-seeking actors begin altering and undermining
the initial institutional structure, the institution simply becomes
another mechanism for particularistic accumulation and aids in
perpetuating and exacerbating the resource curse.204 Constitutional
protection of revenue allocation institutions is a credible
commitment mechanism that constrains the future options of
political actors and identifies the revenue allocation institution as a
focal point equilibrium that operates as a coordinating mechanism
for those actors.205 In doing so, the costs of defecting from this
institutional equilibrium by fundamentally altering or completely
undermining the institution are significantly higher under a
constitutional regime than a statutory regime. Institutional change
would have to come through a constitutional amendment, which
generally is a more procedurally and politically challenging
endeavor.206 As of result of this higher institutional barrier,
constitutional protection of natural resource revenue allocation
institutions provides a superior institutional solution to the resource
curse than existing proposals in the literature.
The political logic of coordination provides a further bulwark
against an extant regime ignoring natural resource revenue
allocation institutions within the national constitution. When a
revenue allocation statute gets ignored or fundamentally
undermined, as was the case in Chad, only that statute is affected
and the costs are low relative to the benefits. However, if a similar
course of action occurs in a similar institution that is constitutionally
protected, the costs are considerably higher because elites cannot
ignore or undermine the constitution in a piecemeal fashion.
Ignoring or undermining a revenue allocation institution would
begin to unravel the fundamental rules of the political game.
Accordingly, the costs of deviating from the constitutional
equilibrium and focal point would be to undermine the very
203 See Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84, at 209.
204 See Terry Lynn Karl,How to Maintain State-Society Relations? The Case
for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE,
supra note 14, at 274, 274–75 [hereinafter Karl, How to Maintain State-Society
Relations].
205 See Levinson, supra note 174, at 708.
206 See Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84.
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institutional framework under which the regime operates. Elites will
be more likely to abide by constitutional revenue allocation
institutions, even if they are not preferential to the extant regime.
This prescription is by no means a panacea. Inherent in many
countries with low state capacity and a poor record of governance is
the problem that the constitution, despite being the most
authoritative legal and political instrument in the land, may not be
followed or simply replaced if inconsistent with the objectives of the
current regime.207 In a similar vein, building from the longstanding
concern that constitutions may amount to nothing more than
“parchment barriers,”208 David Law and Mila Versteeg identify the
disjunction between the state as environed by the de jure
constitution and the state that actually exists in a de facto
constitutional sense.209 The literature has identified an upsetting
“relationship between constitutional rights provisions and actual
respect for rights.”210 Countries whose constitutions contain a
greater number of rights tend also to experience higher levels of
political violence and terror, and certain constitutional guarantees
correlate with higher levels of severe rights abuse.211 Empirically
documenting the global prevalence and severity of constitutional
noncompliance over the last three decades, Law and Versteeg’s
207 See, e.g., Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 105, at 76
(“Incorporating these ideas into the constitution does not necessarily mean that an
unaccountable government will abide by them. Constitutional provisions do not
automatically equate with compliance or constitutional governance.”).
208 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
209 See David S. Law, Constitutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 376, 377 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds.,
2010); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CAL. L. REV.
863, 867–68 (2013) [hereinafter Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions].
210 Law&Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 209, at 381–83; see also
ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OFNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 53–55
(2009) (providing data showing “the extent to which rights provisions are
implemented in practice varies dramatically across countries, with some countries
promising more than they deliver and others delivering more than they promise”).
211 See Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 209, at 382; David
S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global
Constitutionalism, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1219–20 (2011) [hereinafter Law &
Versteeg, Evolution and Ideology].
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conceptualizations of “sham constitutions”—those with high de jure
rights protections and low de facto rights protections—and “weak
constitutions”—those with low de jure and de facto rights
protections—could both be instances where constitutional
protections of natural resource revenue allocation institutions could
simply be ignored or changed at will.212
Although these theories cut against the argument of this Article,
constitutionally protected natural resource revenue allocation
institutions still provide a superior domestic institutional solution to
the resource curse because the consequences of ignoring the
constitution or not enforcing its provisions are still more costly than
similar actions under a statutory regime. Although the argument can
be proffered that Law and Versteeg focus on rights, which are
different from structures insofar as structures are more durable and
less sham than rights, nations simply not following their
constitutions as a whole is a legitimate concern for the argument of
this Article. Law and Versteeg’s distinction between “sham
constitutions” and “weak constitutions” suggests a possible
precondition for the utility of constitutional revenue allocation
institutions for natural resources. In sham constitutions, the costs
associated with not providing a number of constitutional rights may
not be prohibitively high enough for a natural resource revenue
allocation institution to exist without being altered or undermined.
However, in weak constitutions that both promise and deliver little
in terms of rights, the coordination mechanism could have a strong
effect on the cost-benefit calculation of elites. By including revenue
allocation institutions in their constitutions, these countries could
prevent defection by raising its costs, thereby putting the rules of the
political game at stake.
The difference between sham and weak constitutions stems from
the strength of the signal associated with adding a new constitutional
provision relative to the number of existing rights. Ultimately, with
respect to countries with sham constitutions, there may be a
constellation of cases under which the contention of this Article may
be less effective. Further testing would be required to determine the
empirical limits of this argument. The next Part of this Article
identifies several instances where natural resource revenue
212 Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 209, at 882–86.
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allocations have been enshrined in constitutions and how
constitutional and institutional design principles can be utilized to
improve natural resource revenue management in poorly
institutionalized nations.
III. THEODDCOUPLE: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS OF
NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUE INALASKA ANDNIGERIA
Most allocation mechanisms involving revenues from natural
resources are created by statute; however, some of these institutions
are enshrined in constitutions.213 This Article focuses on two
constitutionally enshrined natural resource revenue allocation
institutions: the Alaska Permanent Fund (“APF”), which is a
revenue distribution agreement that utilizes a dividend-style cash
transfer, and Nigeria’s Federation Account, which employs a
revenue decentralization mechanism.214 While the APF has been
widely celebrated as a success,215 Nigeria has been identified as an
epitome of the resource curse and its revenue allocation mechanism
has received mixed reviews.216 This Article suggests that the
critiques of the Nigerian allocation system do not stem from its
constitutional protections, but rather decentralization principles.
Accordingly, constitutional protection is a positive first step. Nigeria
should implement a constitutionally protected natural resource fund
and revenue distribution agreement similar to the APF in order to
improve its management and allocation of hydrocarbon revenues.
A. Alaska: The First Frontier of RDAs
Alaska established the APF in 1976 through a constitutional
amendment with a “negative goal”—namely, “to place part of the
one-time oil wealth beyond the reach of day-to-day government
213 See Bell & Faria, supra note 85; Brosio, supra note 141, at 244–54.
214 Although this case selection may not seem immediately intuitive,
Versteeg and Zackin have shown that American state constitutions are strikingly
similar to world constitutions. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American
Constitutionalism Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1641
(2014).
215 See infra notes 238–44 and accompanying text.
216 See infra notes 245–52 and accompanying text.
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spending.”217 Three purposes underlaid the APF: (1) to provide a
mechanism for equitable distribution to the people of Alaska of at
least a portion of the state’s energy wealth derived from the
development and production of the natural resources belonging to
them as Alaskans; (2) to encourage persons to maintain their
residence in Alaska and to reduce population turnover in the state;
and (3) to encourage increased awareness and involvement by the
residents of the state in the management and expenditure of the
fund.218 This legislation was amended in 1980 to provide that equal
payments be distributed to all eligible residents, including minors,
provided they intended to remain permanently in the state.219 This
followed the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zobel v. Williams,220 which
held that the legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.221 The
APF was the first fund to grant recognition to the notion that citizens
have full rights to share directly in the revenue accruing from public
assets.222 Article 9, Section 15 of the Alaskan Constitution provides
the foundation for the APF:
[a]t least twenty-five percent of all mineral lease
rentals, royalties, royalty sale proceeds, federal
mineral revenue sharing payments and bonuses
received by the State shall be placed in a permanent
fund, the principal of which shall be used only for
those income-producing investments specifically
designated by law as eligible for permanent fund
investments. All income from the permanent fund
shall be deposited in the general fund unless
otherwise provided by law.223
217 Elmer Rasmuson, Address at the 1993 Alaska Permanent Fund
Corporation Annual Meeting: A Founder’s Reflection on the Early Days of the
Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (Sept. 28, 1993),
http://www.apfc.org/_amiReportsArchive/1997_TP5.pdf.
218 Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 1(b), 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 2.
219 ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.095(8) (Supp. 1992).
220 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
221 Id. at 65.
222 Vernon L. Smith, The Iraqi People’s Fund, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2003,
at A14.
223 ALASKACONST. art. IX, § 15.
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“Subsequent legislation . . . increased [the applicable percentage] to
50 percent for certain types of oil and gas receipts,”224 but “the
[Alaskan] legislature repealed the change in 2003 and returned to
the 25% standard.”225
As the APF grew, “Alaskans demanded . . . a return of some of
the wealth to the citizen[ry] . . . [through] tax repeal and cash
distributions.”226 These demands were consistent with Governor Jay
Hammond’s distribution plan that provided a cash dividend to
Alaskan residents based on time of residence within the state.227 The
underlying logic of cash dividends was to create a financial
incentive to maintain residence in Alaska.228 The dividends also
provide a check on government spending by giving Alaskan
beneficiaries a stake in oil revenue,229 and the belief that “the money
could be used better by individuals than spent on government
programs or invested in development projects.”230 In 1980, the
legislature responded by annually distributing half of the APF’s
earnings to state residents in the form of dividend payments.231
The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (“APFC”) manages
the APF.232 The APFC is tasked with “invest[ing] the principal in
224 ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.010(2) (2016); Beattie v. United States, 635 F.
Supp. 481, 482 (D. Alaska 1986), aff’d sub nom. Greisen v. United States, 831
F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Beattie v. United States, 485 U.S. 1006
(1988).
225 Deborah Groban Olson, Fair Exchange: Providing Citizens with Equity
Managed by a Community Trust, in Return for Government Subsidies or Tax
Breaks to Businesses, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 292 (2006).
226 Duruigbo,Managing Oil Revenues, supra note 79, at 178.
227 Clifford Groh & Gregg Erickson, The Permanent Fund Dividend
Program: Alaska’s “Noble Experiment,” ALASKA J., Summer 1983, at 141, 141–
45.
228 Id. at 29.
229 Id.
230 Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend and
Membership in the State’s Political Community, 29 ALASKA L. REV. 79, 82
(2012).
231 Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 21, § 2, 1980 Alaska Sess. Laws 2. Currently,
one-quarter of the APF is distributed via dividend. See Olson, supra note 225, at
292.
232 Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, supra note 102,
at 242.
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stocks, bond, and real estate,” and its “mandate is to maximize
earnings.”233 The APFC was designed to be insulated from day-to-
day politics while remaining accountable to Alaskan residents.234
This balance was struck by having a board composed of independent
trustees, a requirement that the APFC report annually to the
Legislative Budget and Audit Committee, and a requirement that the
APFC’s annual budget be approved by the legislature.235
Importantly, removal of board members is effective only when
accompanied by a statement disclosed to the public containing the
reasons for removal.236 Public access to information regarding how
much the APF earns and how the revenues are distributed further
exemplifies this emphasis on transparency.237
The APF has been widely perceived as a success and extolled as
“one of the most remarkable social experiments in modern
American history.”238 Others have described it as “a result of
evolution of thought regarding state ownership of wealth, and how
that money should be managed to best benefit all Alaskans, present
and future.”239 Much of the APF’s success has been attributed “to
[the] singleness of financial stewardship,”240 its emphasis on
information disclosure and transparency,241 and, perhaps most
importantly, its institutional endurance due to layers of oversight,242
political insulation, and constitutional protection. In light of the
APF’s success, commentators have suggested that similar models be
233 Id.
234 SVETLANA TSALIK, CASPIAN REVENUE WATCH, CASPIAN OIL
WINDFALLS: WHOWILLBENEFIT? 22 (Robert Ebel ed., 2003).
235 See ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.050 (2016); ALASKA PERMANENT FUND
CORPORATION, AN ALASKAN’S GUIDE TO THE PERMANENT FUND 32 (12th ed.
2009); TSALIK, supra note 234.
236 TSALIK, supra note 234.
237 See Duruigbo,Managing Oil Revenues, supra note 79, at 179.
238 Groh & Erickson, supra note 227.
239 Joan Kasson, The Creation of the Alaska Permanent Fund: A Short
History, in THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND 11, 12
(1997), http://cui-zy.com/Recommended/AlaskaPermanentFund.pdf.
240 Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in
Resource-Rich Countries Through Middle-Ground Policies, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 199, 272 (2013).
241 Duruigbo,Managing Oil Revenues, supra note 79, at 178–79.
242 TSALIK, supra note 234, at 22.
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used in other natural resource-rich countries, such as Iraq243 and
Peru.244
B. Nigeria: Oil Slays the Giant of Africa
In contrast to Alaska, Nigeria has been a poster child of the
resource curse.245Nancy Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian conclude
that “[n]owhere have all the pathologies associated with oil
manifested themselves more clearly than in Nigeria.”246 Nigeria’s
per capita GDP was $1,113 in 1970 and $1,084 in 2000; between
these two dates, the percentage of citizens living on less than $1 per
day increased from 36 percent to 69 percent.247 These pathologies
extend into the institutional realm, as Nigeria is one of the best-
known instances of a rentier state.248 In assessing Nigeria’s
socioeconomic malaise and political predicament despite years of
being a major oil exporter, Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind
Subramanian explain these problems in terms of “stunted
institutional development.”249 They contend that “[w]aste and
corruption from oil rather than Dutch Disease has been responsible
for [Nigeria’s] poor long run economic performance.”250 Rent-
seeking practices, kleptocracy, and corruption are evident in
virtually every layer of Nigerian politics and society,251 with
243 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 222; Sandra T. Vreedenburgh, The Saddam
Oil Contracts and What Can Be Done, 2 DEPAULBUS. & COM. L. J. 559, 584–86
(2004).
244 See, e.g., Wieland, supra note 240, at 271–73.
245 See Jenik Radon, How to Negotiate an Oil Agreement, in ESCAPING THE
RESOURCECURSE, supra note 14, at 89, 94 (“Notwithstanding its considerable oil
wealth and its inherited British established institutions and legal system, Nigeria
has been bedeviled by the natural resource curse and has witnessed a significant
decrease in living standards, unfathomable corruption, and societal strife.”); see
also Shaxson, supra note 13, at 1123–24, 1127.
246 Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 82.
247 Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 4; Shaxson, supra note
13, at 1123–24.
248 See GARY&KARL, supra note 116, at 27–28.
249 Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 5.
250 Id. at 3.
251 See Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria:
A Reform Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 397, 397–99 (2002).
CONSTITUTIONS AS COUNTER-CURSES 333
estimates that Nigerian politicians may have taken up to $100 billion
of national oil revenue for their personal gain between 1970 and
2000.252
Nigeria’s constitutional history of allocating natural resource
revenues began at independence in 1960.253 Section 140 of the 1963
Constitution made provisions for the sharing of the proceeds of
minerals, including mineral oil: “[t]here shall be paid by the federal
government to a region, a sum equal to fifty percent of proceeds of
any royalty received by the Federation in respect of any minerals
extracted in that region and any mining rents derived by the federal
government from within any region.”254 Although a de jure federal
state, a series of decrees beginning in 1969, particularly the
Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Act of 1978, “completely
undermined and subverted” Nigeria’s federal basis by centralizing
fiscal power and creating a de facto unitary state with respect to
energy policy by providing the federal government exclusive power
to legislate on hydrocarbons.255 This, in turn, led to a “paternalistic
form of federalism” that characterizes contemporary Nigeria.256
The current incarnation of Nigeria’s revenue allocation methods
is located in Section 162 of the 1999 Constitution.257 The
Government of Nigeria must “maintain a special account . . . [known
as] ‘the Federation Account,’” which is funded by all government
revenue, less “the proceeds from the personal income tax of the
personnel of the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigeria Police
Force, the Ministry or department of government charged with
responsibility for Foreign Affairs, and the residents of the Federal
252 Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 82.
253 Lanre Aladeitan, Ownership and Control of Oil, Gas, and Mineral
Resources in Nigeria: Between Legality and Legitimacy, 38 T.MARSHALLL.REV.
159, 192 (2013).
254 CONSTITUTION OFNIGERIA (1963), § 140.
255 Aladeitan, supra note 253 (quoting Innocent A. Ojefia, The Nigerian
State and the Niger Delta Question (Sept. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2004/sep/071.html); see DICKOVICK, supra note
140 (emphasizing a dynamic view of federalism and the importance of
decentralization and recentralization over time).
256 Aladeitan, supra note 253.
257 CONSTITUTION OFNIGERIA (1999), §§ 162–168.
334 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Capital Territory, Abuja.”258 The allocation of the Federation
Account to the states is determined by a formula based on six
principles: (1) equality of states; (2) population; (3) derivation; (4)
social development factor; (5) landmass and terrain; and (6) internal
revenue generation effort.259
The equality of states principle is based on allocating revenue
equally between the states, and is sometimes termed “minimum
responsibility of government.”260 This reflects the idea “that
each . . . state[] has to sustain a basic minimum set of public
functions and institutions [independent] of its size or population.”261
The population principle states that revenue should be allocated
among states on a per capita basis, justified by the fact that states
with higher populations require more revenue to support them.262
The social development factor measures how a state has responded
to its population’s needs, operationalized through criteria such as the
number of hospital beds, primary and secondary school enrollment,
and average annual rainfall.263 The landmass and terrain principle
indicates that a state has a greater need for revenue allocation
because its terrain or landmass acts as a deterrent for the state
generating its own revenue.264 The internal revenue generation
effort principle operates as an incentive for states to have high
258 Id. § 162(1).
259 Id. § 162(2); see also ROTIMI T. SUBERU, FEDERALISM AND ETHNIC
CONFLICT INNIGERIA 58, 58–59 (2001).
260 FEDERAL INLAND REVENUE SERVICE, A COMPREHENSIVE TAX HISTORY
OFNIGERIA 7 (2012).
261 Id.
262 AUGUSTINE IKEIN & COMFORT BRIGGS-ANIGBOH, OIL AND FISCAL
FEDERALISM IN NIGERIA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
IN ADEVELOPINGCOUNTRY 239 (1998).
263 FEDERAL INLANDREVENUE SERVICE, supra note 260, at 10–11.
264 SUBERU, supra note 259, at 67. See generally Ehtisham Ahmad & Raju
Singh, Political Economy of Oil-Revenue Sharing in a Developing Country:
Illustrations from Nigeria 1 (IMF Working Paper, Jan. 2003) (examining the
incentives an oil-rich region to share resources within a federation).
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extractive capacity265 by matching internally generated tax revenue
with additional federal revenue.266
The derivation principle states that subnational units should
receive revenue from the central government based on the
proportion of revenue contributed from the respective sub-national
unit.267 The derivation principle’s use, or lack thereof, has been a
“political lightning rod,”268 and has fomented significant debate in
the literature. Rotimi Suberu highlights derivation’s faults,
including its tendency to hinder redistribution and other
macroeconomic efforts and to arouse envy and political
instability.269 In contrast, Augustine Ikein and Comfort Briggs-
Anigboh note that derivation aims to compensate for what oil-
producing areas view as a taking of their property, as the oil is
derived from land under their control.270 They also discuss
derivation as a tool to compensate oil-producing areas for the
negative externalities they suffer from exploration.271
Although the National Assembly is charged with considering
these factors and determining their respective weights in the
formula, Section 162(2) of the Nigerian Constitution provides an
exception that “the principle of derivation shall be constantly
reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen per
cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from
265 Extractive capacity is “the ability of the state to raise the revenues it needs
to pay for the expenses of implementing its policies and goals.” Deborah
Brautigam, State Capacity and Effective Governance, in AGENDA FOR AFRICA’S
ECONOMICRENEWAL 83 (Benno Ndulu & Nicolas van de Walle eds., 1996).
266 Ahmad & Singh, supra note 264, at 13–14.
267 IKEIN&BRIGGS-ANIGBOH, supra note 262, at 228–29.
268 SUBERU, supra note 259, at 63–64; Adam B. Felsenthal, Is Iraq the Next
Nigeria?: Revenue Sharing and the Natural Resource Curse, 27 ARIZ. J. INT’L&
COMP. L. 787, 799 (2010); see IKEIN&BRIGGS-ANIGBOH, supra note 262, at 130–
40 (detailing the history of derivation from 1968 to 1977).
269 SUBERU, supra note 259, at 63–64; see also IKEIN & BRIGGS-ANIGBOH
supra note 262, at 116 (discussing the argument that the derivation principle
promotes instability), 235 (discussing uneven development and an inability to
correct the problem due to restricted labor mobility), 305, 311–12 (discussing
social development problems, and additional revenues are beyond absorptive
capacity of oil producing state).
270 IKEIN&BRIGGS-ANIGBOH, supra note 262, at 174–75.
271 Id. at 235.
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any natural resources.”272 In addition to divisiveness, the major
critique associated with derivation is a familiar one.273 Political
leaders of hydrocarbon-producing areas have been cited for rampant
corruption and waste of the derivation revenue received.274 Nancy
Birdsall and Arvind Subramanian contend that corrupt oil revenue
distribution has significantly increased the economic inequality of
Nigeria.275 In 1970, the top 2 percent of earners earned as much as
the bottom 17 percent compared to the bottom 57 percent in 2000.276
As a result, commentators have called for an overhaul of Nigeria’s
allocation principles.277
C. “North to the Future:”What Nigeria Can Learn from
Alaksa
The underlying allocation criteria and fiscal federalism
mechanics, rather than their constitutional protection, are at the core
of Nigeria’s resource curse. Indeed, Kenneth Wheare has
pessimistically noted “there is and can be no final solution to the
allocation of financial resources in a federal system.”278 Ultimately,
Nigeria’s current allocation system simply shifts revenue from one
level of rent-seeking institutions to another without establishing the
credible commitments necessary to facilitate optimal utilization of
natural resource revenues.279 Although a different institutional
structure of natural resource revenue allocation is needed, creating
institutional vehicles for such allocation through constitutions is a
promising first step.
272 CONSTITUTION OFNIGERIA (1999), § 162(2).
273 See Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 81–82. Such divisiveness
refers to the regional tension between the envy of non-natural resource-producing
states and not properly compensating natural resource-producing states. See, e.g.,
id.
274 See SUBERU, supra note 259, at 64–65.
275 Birdsall & Subramanian, supra note 13, at 82.
276 Id.
277 See IKEIN & BRIGGS-ANIGBOH, supra note 262, at 280; SUBERU, supra
note 259, at 76–77, 81–84; Adedotun O. Phillips, Managing Fiscal Federalism:
Revenue Allocation Issues, 21 PUBLIUS 103, 111 (1991).
278 KENNETHWHEARE, FEDERALGOVERNMENT 117 (1963).
279 See Phillips, supra note 277, at 104.
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Drawing on the success of Alaska, Nigeria should create a
constitutionally protected natural resource fund modeled after the
APF. Distributing hydrocarbon revenue to the public in the form of
dividends provides the benefits of revenue distribution
arrangements by minimizing rent-seeking and creating the proper
incentives for governance by requiring the government to rely on
normal fiscal principles to determine appropriate levels of taxation
and expenditure. Furthermore, it avoids many of the issues
associated with using natural resource funds without the requisite
institutional foundations, namely, the tendency for funds to be
undermined through raiding or substantial alteration.280 Providing
constitutional protection for the fund and its particular design
features and allocation mechanisms creates additional safeguards
against government misuse and establishes the credible commitment
mechanism needed to foster institutional endurance.
Four specific design features are particularly salient to this
recommendation: (1) the fund creation; (2) the character of the
recipient of dividends; (3) the nature of the distributions; and (4)
implementation concerns. Creating the fund in the existing Nigeria
Sovereign Investment Authority (“NSIA”)281—created in 2011 to
manage three of the country’s planned oil sovereign wealth funds—
would be an ideal choice for several reasons. The NSIA is
independently managed by JPMorgan Chase, which provides the
fund a significant level of political insulation with respect to
investing the fund’s principal.282 Providing constitutional protection
for the NSIA would also respond to the Central Bank of Nigeria’s
call for constitutional protection of the country’s sovereign wealth
fund.283 The acting Governor of the Central Bank, Serah Alade,
emphasized how protecting the fund would allow Nigeria to be able
280 See Humphreys & Sandbu, supra note 84, at 195.
281 See Nigeria Sovereign Investment Authority Act, Federal Republic of
Nigeria Official Gazette, June 3, 2011, http://nsia.com.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/NSIA_ACT.pdf.
282 See Ben Agande, JP Morgan to Manage Sovereign Wealth Funds,
VANGUARD NEWS (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/02/jp-
morgan-to-manage-soverign-wealth-funds/.
283 See Nigeria: CBN Calls for Inclusion of Sovereign Wealth Fund in the
Constitution, ALL AFRICA (May 7, 2014),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201405071159.html.
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to both stabilize against changes in commodity prices and save for
future generations.284 Lastly, constitutional protection of the NSIA
would clear up extant legal issues of the constitutionality or mere
existence of the NSIA. After one billion U.S. dollars were
contributed as seed money to the NSIA, thirty-six state governors
filed court submissions to block the sovereign wealth fund’s
creation because annual payouts would decrease the pool of oil
profits distributed to individual states, and because the governors did
not trust the leaders in control of the fund.285 The Nigeria Governors
Forum challenged the fund under Sections 80(1)286 and 162(1) and
(3)287 of the Constitution.288 Although the Nigerian Supreme Court
has not yet deemed this a constitutional issue,289 providing
constitutional protection for the NSIA would cease
intergovernmental conflict on this point.
284 Id.
285 Oliver T. Gilbert, Global Analytical Lessons for Evaluating A Myanmar
Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 579, 609–10 (2014).
286
All revenues or other moneys raised or received by the
Federation (not being revenues or other moneys payable under
this Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly into any
other public fund of the Federation established for a specific
purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Revenue
Fund of the Federation.
CONSTITUTION OFNIGERIA (1999), § 80(1).
287
The Federation shall maintain a special account to be called ‘the
Federation Account’ into which shall be paid all revenues
collected by the Government of the Federation . . . [and] (3)
Any amount standing to the credit of the Federation Account
shall be distributed among the Federal and State Governments
and the Local Government Councils in each State.
Id. §§ 162(1), (3).
288 Omodele Adigun, Sovereign Wealth Fund: Why Governors are Kicking,
NBF NEWS (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.nigerianbestforum.com/blog/sovereign-
wealth-fund-why-governors-are-kicking/; see also Gilbert, supra note 285, at
616–17.
289 Governors to Seek S/Court’s Resolution on Excess Crude Account,
NATION (July 29, 2013), http://thenationonlineng.net/excess-crude-account-
governors-to-seek-supreme-courts-resolution/.
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Second, although the intuitive answer in respect to who should
receive fund dividends would be all Nigerian citizens, this Article
contends that only adults should be entitled to dividends. The logic
draws from development economics and the inverse relationship
between fertility rates and economic development, known as the
demographic-economic paradox.290 If all citizens, including
children, are entitled to dividends, fiscal incentives to increase
fertility are introduced, which may have deleterious economic and
social outcomes for Nigeria. According to Xavier Sala-i-Martin and
Arvind Subramanian, if dividends trigger at the age of majority, the
incentive to have more children would be lessened since the revenue
associated with extra children would be postponed for eighteen
years.291
A third question is whether all the revenues should be distributed
or whether a certain share should be retained to enable the
government to provide public goods. One of the main causal
mechanisms of the “rentier[ ] [state] is that when governments gain
most of their revenues from external sources, such as resource rents
or foreign assistance, they are freed from the need to levy domestic
taxes and . . . become less accountable to the societies they
govern.”292 This is currently the case in Nigeria:
[c]urrently, oil accounts for a substantial share of
total government revenues. As such, the government
has little incentive to provide services efficiently
because the discipline exerted by the need to tax the
public is largely absent: oil revenues are manna from
heaven and keep flowing regardless of what the
public sector delivers.293
290 See Quamrul H. Ashraf et al., The Effect of Fertility Reduction on
Economic Growth, 39 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 97, 97 (2013). But see Mikko
Myrskylä et al., Advances in Development Reverse Fertility Rate, 460
NATURE 741, 741–43 (2009) (concluding that there is a J-shaped relationship
between development and fertility).
291 Sala-i-Martin & Subramaniam, supra note 13, at 20.
292 Elias Chukwuemeka Ngwu & Anthony Chinedu Ugwu, Rentierism and
the Natural Resource Curse: A Contextual Analysis of Nigeria, 1 J. SOC. SCI. &
HUMAN. 422, 423 (2015).
293 Sala-i-Martin & Subramaniam, supra note 13, at 20.
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Accordingly, a goal of the fund should be to reduce the
government’s dependence on natural resource revenue and, instead,
create incentives to develop extractive capacity and become
dependent on tax revenues to fund public goods. Accordingly, the
government should ultimately not retain any share of the revenue;
the fund revenue should be either distributed as dividends or
invested via the sovereign wealth fund.
Lastly, although there are very real and salient concerns over
corruption and fund diversion or leakage in the process of
distributing dividends, constitutional protection provides an
important countervailing check to those potential abuses. If an
eligible citizen does not receive his or her dividend, he or she has a
constitutional right to seek relief under the judicial system. Under
the existing system, citizens rely on public officials and institutions
for receiving the oil money indirectly through public services that
may never fully trickle down due to rent-seeking and corruption.294
Under this Article’s recommendation, citizens would have an
automatic and justiciable right to receive the proceeds directly.295
The economic effects of such a revenue distribution arrangement
in Nigeria would be considerable. Xavier Sala-i-Martin and Arvind
Subramaniam estimate the magnitude of household payments under
two scenarios. Under current and future production levels, each
household would receive U.S. $140, or U.S. $425 in per capita terms
measured by purchasing power parity (“PPP”) (roughly $760 per
adult).296 This figure “represent[s] about 43[%] of current per capita
PPP GDP and well above the US $1 per day poverty line.”297 If
natural gas revenue is also part of revenue distribution, “these
amounts could increase to upwards of U.S. $750 per capita (U.S.
$1,330 per adult) in PPP terms.”298 “If debt relief were to
result, . . . then the total income to households would
[increase] . . . [by] an additional U.S, $100 per capita in PPP
294 See Keenan, supra note 56, at 223, 228.
295 But see Law & Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, supra note 209, at 864
(concluding that “socioeconomic and group rights are somewhat less likely to be
upheld” than the other personal integrity rights and civil and political freedoms).
296 Sala-i-Martin & Subramaniam, supra note 13, at 19.
297 Id.
298 Id.
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terms.”299 Ultimately, utilizing constitutional design principles to
allocate revenue from natural resources provides a promising
solution to mitigating and reversing the resource curse.
CONCLUSION
Although the literature has proffered a plethora of institutional
solutions to the resource curse, they have been vexed by a common
theme: their unsuccessful implementation in developing countries
without the proper institutional foundations that act as a bulwark
against policy reversal and the perpetuation of rent-seeking
behavior. Accordingly, these institutions lack a mechanism for rent-
seeking states to credibly commit to managing and utilizing natural
resource wealth in a restrained, welfare-enhancing, and non-
particularistic manner. This Article has contributed to the existing
literature by suggesting constitutional protections of natural
resource revenue allocation institutions as a means of credible
commitment. The precommitment and coordination functions of
constitutions significantly reduce the cost of opportunistic policy
reversal and consequently encourage the institutional endurance and
entrenchment necessary for natural resource revenues to be properly
insulated and effectively managed. Ultimately, constitutions
represent a new frontier for both policymakers and scholars to
address one of the more persistent and paradoxical problems facing
the developing world.
Policymakers in natural resource-rich nations with weak formal
institutions should strongly consider creating and further developing
revenue management and allocation mechanisms within their
constitutional frameworks. However, a fundamental question,
particularly in the contexts of rentier states and the entrenchment of
rent-seeking practices under the status quo, is why would vested
political interests undertake such reforms and, in doing so,
undermine the source of their political and economic power? Often,
radical policy change is easier to accomplish than incremental
change due to the galvanization of public support or the existence of
299 Id.
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exogenous shocks.300 Elsewhere, I have argued that the depth of the
“socioeconomic trough” has a strong causal effect on nations that
undertake radical policy reform.301 The resource curse and the
associated wasteful spending and corruption are arguably the most
daunting issues in Nigeria; accordingly, institutional reform in this
arena could be a focal point around which Nigerians could
coordinate.
In light of the increased difficulty in amending constitutions
relative to other laws, drafting the constitutional provisions correctly
is of particular importance. It is essential that policymakers in these
countries recognize that there is not a “one size fits all” solution to
managing natural resource revenue under the constitution. Like any
other law, it must be adapted to the needs, institutions, and legal
framework of the country. There are a number of institutional design
features for policymakers to consider during the drafting process,
including the establishment and design of the fund, the entity or
institution that will be managing the fund and its portfolios, and
what principles and policies will govern the investment of the
fund.302 In light of the design flaws of other funds, such as the
Chadian RML, properly defining which cash flows from natural
resource rents will constitute the fund is critically important.303 If an
RDA is utilized, defining who receives dividends and how
frequently they are distributed are integral to minimizing the
administrative costs of such a policy. Lastly, although the
Norwegian and Alaskan models cannot likely be imported whole
cloth to weaker states, these funds’ attentions to oversight and
transparency is one feature that should especially be emphasized.
300 See DAVID COLLIER & RUTH COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA
29 (1991) (describing a critical juncture as “a period of significant change, which
typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of
analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies”).
301 See Tom Brower, Wash. & Lee Univ., Presentation at the Virginia Social
Science Association Annual Conference: State Capacity Formation as Functions
of Economic Crisis and International Actors: Ghana 1981–1992 (Apr. 5, 2008)
(on file with author); see also Thomas M. Callaghy, Lost Between State and
Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria, in
ECONOMICCRISIS AND POLICYCHOICE 257, 263 (Joan M. Nelson ed., 1990).
302 See supra Section III.C.
303 See Bell & Faria, supra note 85, at 312.
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Particularly in weak or low capacity states, avoiding excess
complexity and limiting or not permitting discretionary judgment
using bright-line rules has been suggested.304 With proper drafting
and design, constitutional revenue allocation institutions can be an
effective tool in addressing the resource curse.
304 Id. at 287.
